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Fraser shows TVNZ giving lip service to Charter

14 December 2005



13 December 2005


Fraser bombshell shows TVNZ

giving lip service to Charter


A memo to the

TVNZ Board from then CEO Ian Fraser says the state

broadcaster has become virtually indistinguishable from

commercial channels and is giving no more than lip service

to its Charter obligations, Green Party Broadcasting

Spokesperson Sue Kedgley says.


The document, titled "A

More Public Broadcaster" and dated "October 2005", was

obtained by Ms Kedgley. It says TVNZ's local content will

"shrink markedly" next year to 36 percent, the same level it

was before the Charter, and that it will give priority to

commercially driven Charter programmes that "deliver maximum

commercial value and maximum audience share and protect our

channel shares from competitive erosion." Further, he warns

that TVNZ is faced with "the reality of having to can such

Charter initiatives or consigning Charter programmes to

inhospitable places in the schedule unless they are 'sure

bets'."


"This memo shows that the man who was at the helm

of TVNZ believed that its current mixed model is failing to

deliver on its Charter goals because they are essentially

incompatible with its commercial priorities," Ms Kedgley

says.


"Fraser says 'the texture of our schedule is

profoundly incompatible with any recognisable model of

public broadcasting' and warns that the organisation has

'made a u-turn' away from its public service television

mandate and is becoming almost totally focused on commercial

objectives."


"Ian Fraser's bombshell suggests it's time to

acknowledge that the present split focus of TVNZ has failed

to deliver public service television and to begin a

fundamental review of its mandate and direction.


Mr Fraser

proposes three options for restructuring TVNZ to better

deliver public service television - making TV One a fully

funded, non-commercial public broadcaster entirely charged

with delivering Charter values; making TV One a

semi-commercial broadcaster screening no more than six

minutes of advertisements an hour; or adding two new public

service digital channels.

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"I hope the Government, and

Parliament, will seriously review the three models Mr Fraser

has proposed for restructuring TVNZ to give it a genuine

public service emphasis - in particular his proposal to

convert TV One into a non-commercial public service

broadcaster.


"With 13-14 minutes of advertising every

hour, and a minority of New Zealand programmes screening on

both channels, it is hard for viewers to accept that TVNZ is

public service television," Ms Kedgley says.


Mr Fraser

points out that TVNZ's level of local content is "much lower

than what most similar public broadcasters world-wide

deliver," while its level of advertising - 13-14 minutes an

hour - is higher than comparable public service television

channels around the world.


"This is an indictment on TVNZ

and the Government for allowing this to happen." Ms Kedgley

says.


***********


Ian

Fraser's memo


Is this as good as it

gets?


The Government obviously believes that we don't

stop here. Its vision for public broadcasting is dynamic and

expansive. In its Programme of Action, it declares its

intention to build "a strong and sustainable public

broadcasting environment for New Zealand".


To this end,

since 2000 it has:


* transformed TVNZ from an SOE into a

Crown company, with a set of statutory objectives laid out

in the TVNZ Charter.


* funded TVNZ directly for Charter

purposes. Amounting to about $15 million per year (after

GST), this is the first direct funding from the Government

to the broadcaster in more than 20 years.


* Set the

course towards digital television in August 2003, via

Cabinet endorsement of an extensive Cabinet Committee

report.


In charting the way forward, the Programme of

Action is critical of the fact that because TVNZ relies on

commercial income to a level beyond that of any comparable

nation's public television broadcaster, its behaviour is too

influenced by commercial considerations, whereby "viewers as

consumers are given greater emphasis than viewers as

citizens". Later in the document it underlines the

desirability of public broadcasters not being "dominated by

commercial pressures" and not being driven towards the goal

of "maximising ratings on a commercial model".


The

Programme of Action is clear about what constitutes true

public broadcasting (within a mixed market model). "[Public

broadcasters] are expected to consider the interests of a

range of audiences beyond the demographic groups that

commercially-driven broadcasters are obliged to deliver to

their advertisers. They are charged with providing ... a

comprehensive service covering all aspects of the nation's

life".


It commits the Government to strengthen public

broadcasting by, inter alia, "investigating an appropriate

ratio of commercial to non-commercial funding for TVNZ, as a

guide, to assist in fulfilling the Charter" and places a

priority on the need "to achieve adequacy and certainty of

funding for public broadcasting".


It states: "It is

crucial that TVNZ be enabled to plan with greater confidence

and to develop the comprehensive service intended by its

legislation" [my emphasis]. It also observes that while TVNZ

should have increased resource available for investment in

its mandate as a Chartered public broadcaster, the company

"will be required to demonstrate efficient and effective

capital use".




What's wrong with the current

model?


* Following one year of increased investment

in and much enhanced delivery of local content (average

across both TVNZ channels of 40%-plus in FY2005), the level

of local content on TVNZ will shrink markedly in 2006 and

the outer years to about 36%. This is no more than the local

content ratio we were achieving prior to the introduction of

the Charter. It is a level of local content much lower than

what most similar public broadcasters world-wide deliver. It

makes it hard for us to sustain the claim that local content

differentiates TVNZ from its competitors and is, indeed, the

key element of TVNZ's "Charter difference".


* In the

light of more or less static direct Charter funding in

FY2006 (and an expected fall in advertising revenue), we

have prioritised our local content to deliver maximum

commercial value and protect our channel shares, so far as

we can, from competitive erosion.


This entails a

re-weighting back towards commercial performance after a

couple of years of steady progress in delivering greater

Charter value. A higher priority has been placed on ensuring

that the shows we commission are more commercial and able to

yield audiences that meet our commercially determined

ratings and share targets.


This approach, which will

intensify as the economy tightens, greatly limits our

capacity to make challenging scheduling decisions in line

with the values of the Charter. The game is about maximising

audience in an environment that is no longer a seller's

market. We find ourselves, in a contracting environment,

less able to sustain the opportunity costs that flow from

scheduling a "Charter programme" that under-delivers against

our channel ratings and share targets -- when an

internationally sourced programme acquired for a fraction of

the price would be much more likely to deliver effectively

against them.




* In spite of the increase in the

level of local content we have been driving towards, we have

not yet measured any significant increase in viewer

satisfaction - nor any marked public conviction, after more

than two and a half years experience with the Charter, that

we are more of a public broadcaster than we were before it

was introduced.


The Minister of Broadcasting observed in

July 2005 that "in true New Zealand form, TVNZ have been

knocked from pillar to post for not doing [the Charter]

enough, not doing it quickly enough, not doing it well

enough and not doing it years ago". He went on to state that

"TVNZ are only a short way down the [Charter] path and we

can all look forward to the journey ahead". In fact,

currently the signs are that in many important respects we

have made a U-turn and are retracing our steps back to where

the "journey" began.


* We recognise that we have a major

commercial performance problem with ONE. Work is underway to

restore the performance of ONE News, which drives success -

or failure - through the entire peak time schedule. However,

News is not the only factor in the channel's

under-performance.


We are starting to measure the

opportunity cost associated with some forms of Charter

delivery. We are faced with the reality of having to can

such Charter initiatives or consigning Charter programmes to

inhospitable places in the schedule unless they are "sure

bets".


* The texture of our schedule is profoundly

incompatible with any recognisable model of public

broadcasting. Public broadcasters in the rest of the world

do not broadcast 13-14 minutes per hour of advertising. Our

need to do this to "maintain our commercial performance"

means that many viewers regard us as being more driven, as a

consequence of our dependence on advertising revenue, to

sell them things to meet the needs of advertisers rather

than to meet their diverse needs as viewers.


The "static"

generated by the weight of the commercials we carry impedes

our ability to present ourselves with conviction as a

Chartered public broadcaster and scrambles the message to

viewers that we have a commitment to re-balance TVNZ away

from straight commercial to more public broadcaster

objectives.


* Bob Collins, the former Director General of

RTE, in his speech to the Public Broadcasting Conference in

Wellington (21 November 2003), stated that one of the "clear

and succinct" statements that can be made about public

service broadcasting is that its character is reflected in

comprehensive schedules, not in individual programmes.


"The public character is reflected in the overall

schedules and is not something which inheres in individual

programmes which are then distributed across a schedule

somewhat like sultanas in a fruitcake". The best that TVNZ

has managed to achieve under the current model is the

"sultanas in a fruitcake" approach (also known as

"pepper-potting"). Now, under the combined weight of a

slowing economy and the opportunity costs exacted by some

Charter programming decisions, we are looking to cut back on

the sultanas....


Where to from here?


There appear

to be three options, apart from the default option of doing

nothing:


Option One


Make ONE a fully-funded,

non-commercial public broadcaster, charged to deliver the

values of the Charter. Make TV2 fully commercial, divested

of Charter responsibility, with a remit to generate optimum

commercial revenue to help underwrite ONE.


* In a

Mediawatch discussion with the Minister of Broadcasting (13

February 2005), it was suggested that a non-commercial

public broadcaster could be run for about $140 million. A

more informed back-of-the-envelope estimate (based on what

it costs to run ABC Television) suggests that the cost of

the service would be closer to $200 million. Whatever, it

would almost certainly entail major down-sizing, since it

would be a simpler institution on a smaller scale from a

fully commercial model.


* The cost of international

product would be cheaper because public broadcaster content

is typically much less expensive than commercial

programming.


* It would allow for the merger of ONE,

Radio New Zealand and, possibly, MTS (all the public

broadcasters). They would share a common remit and, in the

case of ONE and Radio New Zealand, a common non-commercial

basis of operation.


* This model is not a hybrid, as the

current paradigm is. It is clearly a public broadcaster and

would be readily identified by the public as one.


* It

falls in the category of "marginalised public broadcaster".

Steve Maharey has publicly taken a stand against that

solution and so has TVNZ.


* Audience share would fall

from around 30% now to as low as 10% (cf BBC2, RTE2, the

ABC). However, from an advertising revenue point of view

this would not matter.


* The fiscal value of ONE would

plummet. Other media, business and political voices would

attack the Government and TVNZ for generating a massive

collapse in shareholder value.


* The funding would come

in the form of new money from the taxpayer. The Government

has stated on many occasions that this solution cannot be

afforded. Mr Maharey said on Mediawatch (13 February):

"Having made that step there's no way that you could put it

to the public to go back to it, that's for sure, so you need

now to work out the common tax take. The vision, I suppose,

that we're working with, with Television New Zealand, is

that here's a company that earns $300 million-plus a year.


Every single one of those dollars should be put to the

task of providing us with a public service television

channel and where they can identify areas that they can't

address with that funding, they ought to be going to New

Zealand On Air, which they traditionally do for funding for

particular programmes, and we've agreed, of course, to work

with them to provide extra funding so that they can meet

that mandate".


Option Two


Make TV2 fully

commercial, divested of Charter obligations. Make ONE

semi-commercial - the Charter channel. This hybrid approach

on ONE rests on the proposition that you can be both a

public broadcaster and a commercial business. As Bob Collins

said in the speech quoted earlier:


"Perhaps the most

evident and at once the most complex of the challenges for a

public broadcaster, if it is dual funded, is how to square

the circle of public remit and commercial resource. Can you

be a public broadcaster in your schedule with commercial

revenue in your bank account? Can your schedule be public in

its character if it is partly commercial in its funding?

Does the funding shape the content?


"Dual funding is a

well-established reality in many states. In many cases,

especially in small countries, it was and remains a

practical response to real situations. If advertising alone

were the funding source, how would the public responsibility

be provided? How would you guarantee plurality from a small

economy?


If public funding alone were the source, how

could the small population guarantee the comprehensive range

of services without the economies of scale? This issue was

easier to resolve in other times when competition was less

widespread and when the measures of success or failure were

less influenced by market criteria.


"It remains, however,

one of the decisive tests. Is the hybrid possible? I believe

that it is. It is not easy. It becomes progressively more

difficult but all my experience tells me that it is still

possible..."


Under this option, the balance would be

tilted much more towards public broadcaster/Charter value on

ONE - perhaps in the order of a 70/30 Charter weighting.


* ONE would carry about 6 minutes an hour of

advertising, more tactfully scheduled than is possible

currently. This is the weight of advertising carried on RTE

and our friends there tell us that it is not so great that

it alienates viewers and provokes them to view RTE as a

commercial rather than a public broadcaster.


* Since ONE

will be targeted more to the "A/B's" (the decision-makers,

influencers, "the chattering classes") and there will be

less inventory available for sale, some areas of the

schedule may attract an advertising premium.


* The target

should be to hold a minimum $60 million commercial revenue

on ONE to help underwrite Option Two.


* Audience share

will fall steeply but not as far as in Option One. Perhaps

to 15%.


* Less or no "pepper-potting" of Charter

programmes. With less pressure to maintain an effective

commercial yield, it will be possible to schedule a much

greater weight of public broadcaster programming and much of

it at more accessible times. * We would still come under an

onslaught for reducing the commercial value of

ONE.


* There would almost certainly be a need to separate

ONE and TV2 institutionally (as there would be in Option

One). It would be almost impossible to make a success of

running one organisation with two such conflicting mandates

- even though the conflict is less radical in Option Two

than in Option One, since TV ONE would still earn

commercial revenue and carry a volume of "commercial"

programmes. TV2 could be run as an SOE and levied to help

support ONE.


* A different cost structure for ONE entails

significant down-sizing and a complete

restructuring.


* Could be funded from a combination of

sources: -- commercial revenue, bulk-funding from NZ on Air,

a levy on TV2, but would still require very significant new

taxpayer funding (perhaps $80-$100 million).


Option

Three (The Third Way)


Keep One and TV2 as they are now

- delivering as much Charter value as they can manage while

rocking and rolling within the constraints of a tightening

economy and the requirement to maintain commercial

performance.


This Option means we should not attempt to

"spin" the current mass audience operation as if it were a

full public broadcaster according to international

benchmarks - though TV ONE and TV2 are obviously much closer

to the public broadcaster end of the spectrum than our

commercial competitors. TV ONE and TV2 would continue to

receive direct Charter funding at or above current levels in

order to acquire and commission Charter programmes. They

would continue to access funds from NZ On Air.


Channels

ONE and 2 would maintain a high audience share and generate

substantial commercial revenue, while pursuing a remit to

give the people of this country New Zealand broadcasting

with a quality and range of content that simply would not be

provided if a strictly commercial approach was the only

basis of what we do.


Added to ONE and TV2, however, we

would provide a clearly recognisable full public

broadcasting option on the digital platform(s). Option

Three is based on the following proposition:


* Make the

first two (or three) new channels on the digital platform(s)

pure, non-commercial public broadcast channels. This would

mean that the way we begin to inhabit the digital space

would be much closer to the pure public broadcaster end of

the spectrum than where we are at currently with ONE and

TV2.


* The channels we have been working on are already

close to this model. Under Option Three the factual channel

would include (a) a lot of public broadcaster programming we

don't currently buy (particularly high end international

documentary content), and (b) a range of time-shifted news

and factual programming acquired from ONE where it has had

its first run, and (c) a range of minority programmes placed

at more accessible viewing times, and (d) a greater

proportion of first-run local content, including Question

Time in parliament and, perhaps, programmes like Agenda.


The second digital channel devoted to children would

follow the line currently proposed but the night-time

schedule might be devoted to serious drama and arts rather

than the more commercial lifestyle-oriented concept now

contemplated. Again, there would be a mix of re-run and

first run programming - with a greater balance of first run

than has been considered until now.


* This approach can't

credibly be stigmatised as "ghettoising the Charter". These

pure public broadcaster channels will be available free to

air: you don't have to pay a monthly subscription to gain

access - you must acquire, at a minimum, a set top box.


* Public approval will depend on how quickly we can get

onto free to air digital platforms. If this new dimension of

public broadcasting, delivered on digital, can't be

guaranteed within about a year, the Option becomes less

politically attractive and the public are likely to develop

a cynicism towards it. "Jam tomorrow" is not a slogan this

electorate shows signs of warming to.


* Takes some of the

heat of remit conflict off ONE in particular. ONE no longer

has to schedule an increased weight of Charter programming

where the opportunity cost analysis suggests there is

intolerable commercial risk. There is another place, within

the state broadcaster's stable, where pure, non-commercial

public broadcasting would be readily and universally

available for those who want it.


* No destruction of

fiscal value of ONE and no risk of a decline in audience

share.


* Estimated cost: $40-50 million in new public

funding.


Ian Fr

Source: scoop


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